BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//College of Engineering - University of Wisconsin-Madison - ECPv6.17.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:College of Engineering - University of Wisconsin-Madison
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://engineering.wisc.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for College of Engineering - University of Wisconsin-Madison
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Chicago
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0600
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:CDT
DTSTART:20250309T080000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0600
TZNAME:CST
DTSTART:20251102T070000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0600
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:CDT
DTSTART:20260308T080000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0600
TZNAME:CST
DTSTART:20261101T070000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0600
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:CDT
DTSTART:20270314T080000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0600
TZNAME:CST
DTSTART:20271107T070000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260925T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260925T130000
DTSTAMP:20260903T125743Z
CREATED:20260903T125632Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260903T125743Z
UID:10001593-1790337600-1790341200@engineering.wisc.edu
SUMMARY:ISyE Colloquia Series
DESCRIPTION:UW-ISyE looks forward to welcoming Sean Sinclair from Northwestern University. \n\n\n\nThe Impact of Censoring on Data-Driven Inventory Control \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n Infectious diseases continue to impact millions of people every year around the world\, despite many advances in medicine and technology. Pharmaceutical interventions such as testing\, vaccines\, or treatment\, may not be available\, and when they are\, resources for their deployment are often very limited. Other challenges (e.g.\, logistical\, societal) may also hamper deployment. Decisions regarding what\, when\, and how to deploy need to incorporate various short- and long-term considerations\, as well as human behaviors such as following non-pharmaceutical intervention recommendations or uptake of available pharmaceutical interventions. In this presentation\, we will illustrate these challenges using a few examples from infectious diseases that are targeted for elimination or eradication\, and share results from modeling studies to help inform these complex decisions. \n\n\n\n\n\nBio:  Sean Sinclair is an Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences at Northwestern University\, where he also serves as Director of Graduate Studies. His research develops reinforcement learning algorithms for operations problems\, with recent interests in inventory control and scheduling.  He received his PhD from Cornell University and was previously a postdoctoral associate at MIT.  His work received the 2026 SIGMETRICS Best Paper award\, and his dissertation received honorable mention for both the SIGMETRICS Dissertation and the George Dantzig Dissertation awards.
URL:https://engineering.wisc.edu/event/the-impact-of-censoring-on-data-driven-inventory-control/
LOCATION:1163 Mechanical Engineering\, 1513 Engineering Dr.\, Madison\, WI\, 53706\, United States
CATEGORIES:Colloquium,Industrial & Systems Engineering
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://engineering.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/cohengraphic-5.avif
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261002T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261002T130000
DTSTAMP:20260917T134056Z
CREATED:20260917T134053Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260917T134056Z
UID:10001605-1790942400-1790946000@engineering.wisc.edu
SUMMARY:ISyE Colloquia Series
DESCRIPTION:UW-ISyE looks forward to welcoming Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury from Illinois State University. \n\n\n\nBeyond Nash in Non-Rival Markets: Response-Aware Rational Equilibria \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n We study pricing equilibria in markets with budget-constrained buyers and non-rival goods: selling a good to one buyer does not diminish its availability to others. Our motivating application is the growing market for data to train and improve AI systems\, illustrated by partnerships between Google and Reddit\, OpenAI and News Corp\, and OpenAI and the Financial Times. \n\n\n\nWhat should stable prices mean in these markets? We show that pure Nash equilibrium typically does not exist: even with two sellers and equal buyer budgets\, its probability of existence tends to zero as the number of buyers grows when linear valuation coefficients are drawn independently from a uniform distribution. This motivates revisiting the counterfactual underlying Nash stability. A price cut may appear profitable when competitors’ prices are held fixed\, yet lose its appeal when competitors can respond—for example\, by matching the new price. \n\n\n\nWe introduce response-aware rational equilibrium (RARE). A seller evaluates a deviation against responses that leave each competitor at least as well off as immediately after that deviation. The seller proceeds only if the deviation remains profitable against every such individually rational response. RARE requires that no seller have such a deviation. \n\n\n\nFor strictly increasing\, strictly concave buyer utilities\, we establish existence with two sellers and arbitrary buyer budgets\, and with any number of sellers when buyer budgets are equal. We also introduce monotone revenue ascent\, deterministic dynamics in which each update increases the moving seller’s revenue without reducing anyone else’s. These dynamics reach approximate RARE and converge to exact equilibrium prices under an additional positive-demand condition satisfied by positive-weight CES utilities. \n\n\n\nStarting from a pricing question specific to data markets\, these results suggest a broader direction: understanding stable behavior among agents that anticipate one another’s responses. We conclude by discussing the possibilities—and open questions—for such an equilibrium perspective in markets populated by AI agents. \n\n\n\nBio:  Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering at the University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign\, with an affiliate appointment in the Siebel School of Computing and Data Science. His research lies at the intersection of theoretical computer science\, economics\, and machine learning\, with a focus on fair division\, equilibrium computation\, and the foundations of data economics. He has received several honors\, including the NSF Career Award\, best paper awards at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\, and an oral presentation at ICML.
URL:https://engineering.wisc.edu/event/isye-colloquia-series/
LOCATION:1163 Mechanical Engineering\, 1513 Engineering Dr.\, Madison\, WI\, 53706\, United States
CATEGORIES:Colloquium,Industrial & Systems Engineering
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://engineering.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/cohengraphic-6.avif
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR